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Notes on Joseph Heath’s Enlightenment 2.0


Enlightenment 2.0 by Canadian philosopher Joseph Heath is an almost chauvinistically ambitious book, aiming for nothing less than the restoration of reason into the world of politics. 

Published in 2014, this book has by any measure taken on extra relevance given the events of 2016.

The election of Donald Trump, the Brexit referendum and the increasing likelihood that anti-immigrant parties in Europe will make further electoral gains in the future has moved me to make a few remarks about some of Heath’s ideas.

Heath should be well-known to readers as the co-author with Andrew Potter of The Rebel Sell, a polemical attack on the sort of counter-cultural left criticism associated with Adbusters and Herbert Marcuse; and Filthy Lucre, a similarly polemical jeremiad directed against both left and right assumptions about economics.

People familiar with both books who are also broadly receptive to Heath’s style of combative intellectual gameplay, will relish Enlightenment 2.0. For it is a dazzlingly variegated product, dense with insights and provocations drawn from numerous fields such as cognitive psychology, political economy and public sociology. For some the end result might be anarchic: Heath traverses so many fields in such a brazenly confident manner that the various parts threaten to overwhelm the whole.

However large a sense of structural incompleteness one might feel come the final page, it would be hard not to be thrilled by Heath’s ambition.

At the core of Enlightenment 2.0 is the conflict, both individual and collective, between intuition and reason. Heath spends a large portion of the book scrutinizing the cognitive mechanisms that underlie each. For this purpose Heath is reliant on a number of psychological and evolutionary theories that proclaim our species’ reliance on intuitive thinking.

We evolved to think intuitively in order to deal with elements of our immediate environment. A synonym for intuition is instinct – the word attaching itself to notions of our animal past. This is more or less the image Heath wants us to conjure. Intuition is quick, easy and useful for the resolution of short-term practical problems, in part because it is a part of our ancestry and evolutionary development.

Our rationality, on the other hand, is not strictly speaking part of our evolutionary baggage: it is largely artificial, like civilization itself. But it is integral to the development and coherence of large-scale societies, and makes possible cooperation between non-genetically-related persons. Institutions such as the state and the judicial system are hardly conceivable without the special insight afforded by our reason, which necessarily acts against our instinctual reflexes. Rational thinking is slow, linear, sequential, and in a sense decisively un-natural.

My apologies if all this sounds reductive and essentialist. These are the results, rather than the process, of Heath’s thinking. But Heath is sternly unequivocal in making the case for reason over intuition. Following our instincts is a poor substitute for developing our reason when it comes to dealing with collective action problems, a concept Heath propagates as his equivalent for what the Marxist might call a ‘structural crisis’. In order to resolve collective actions problems – climate change being the most dramatic – we need to call upon our rational capacities to organise society-wide cooperation.

The political environment that preoccupies Heath at the beginning of Enlightenment 2.0 is one where the evasion of policy-oriented discussion makes way for emotional appeals to voters’ guts. This applies as much to Heath’s home of Canada as it does south of the border, where the paranoid style of the Republican Party has come to occupy the mainstream. Heath looks to comedians such as Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert to best illustrate the toxicity of such an environment via the forces of satire.  This was 2014. The situation has inarguably gotten more extreme. And satire has become ill-equipped to deal with a figure such as Donald Trump who by now is beyond parody.

The Donald Trump campaign had a laughable deficit of fleshed-out policies to offer. Its appeal was almost entirely visceral, rendering impotent the endless exposures of Trump’s lies. His electoral victory was a rousing vindication of intuition over reason. But it would be unsatisfactory to declare Trump voters as simply irrational. The effects of a relentlessly globalized economy – in particular the relocation of low-skilled industrial jobs – are certainly real.  No one ought to blame Americans for finding the economic landscape of their country unappealing, or even downright corrupt.

Beyond this, however, there’s not much connecting tissue between Trump’s rabid fan base and critical thinking. If Trump’s base is effective at demonstrating anger, they are less successful in explicating said anger in rationally construed language. Instead the language we get comes in the form of intense feeling (resentment, fear, hostility), pseudo-explanations, nostalgic projections, and worst of all simply making stuff up. And as the recent CNN interview of several Trump supporters by Alisyn Camerota makes clear, a heavy dose of conspiratorial posturing is never far away when interrogating the Trump phenomenon.

Heath makes it clear throughout Enlightenment 2.0 that the determining factors of one’s cognitive preferences for either intuition or rationality are not found exclusively within the brain. If anything Heath grapples more with sociological factors. Rational thinking is undermined or enhanced depending on the social scaffolding of certain environments. A seminar at a university puts environmental pressure on people to listen, concentrate, memorize and understand; as such it enhances our rational capacities.

Dinner parties, supermarkets, or morning TV shows, on the other hand, are environments less hospitable to rational thinking. Heath writes that ‘outside of the privileged environment of the classroom, it is remarkable how seldom anyone is ever forced to sit and listen to someone else explain something (without flipping the channel, checking for status updates, or interrupting)’. The features of rationality that Heath spends so much time explicating – ‘It is slow; it requires attention; it is linguistically based, conscious, and fully explicit’ – are absent from most of the social settings we find ourselves in.

And so part of Heath’s proposals for enhancing the possibility of rational thinking is to tinker with the various environments we operate within. It goes to the heart of his classically liberal outlook to find out that he would prefer we structure our social settings so as to trick ourselves, rather than force ourselves, to think more clearly. This is easier said than done, and in the short-term not likely done at all. As Heath writes towards the end of Enlightenment 2.0: ‘It should go without saying that writing books about the decline of reason is not the sort of thing that is likely to slow the decline of reason’.  For a writer who spends a lot of time dispelling the illusions of others, he is certainly up for facing his own.

*

Heath, J 2014, Enlightenment 2.0: Restoring Sanity to Our Politics, Our Economy and Our Lives, HarperCollins, Toronto







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